EU's 'Global Gateway' and the Gulf region: Addressing the blind spots of digital infrastructures and supply chains in the evolving AI landscape

In 2021, the European Union (EU) initiated the Global Gateway with goals for 2021-2027, including partnerships and investments worldwide in areas like sustainability and digital transformation (European Commission, n.d.a). This encompasses regions such as the Middle East, including projects like the Medusa submarine cables connecting North Africa with Europe (European Commission, n.d.b).

Scholarly discussions and policy considerations concerning digital governance in Europe appear to be insular and concentrated on the Digital Single Market regulatory aspects (Perarnaud, 2021). However, the EU’s Global Gateway developments and partnerships call for a broader global perspective, particularly amid infrastructure developments in the global south (Rosa, 2021). I contend that European digital and internet policies must consider digital policy and infrastructure in the Middle East, particularly in the Gulf region, expanding the geographical and regulatory frontiers of the European digital space discussions.

The EU’s strategic partnership with the Gulf

One significant partnership in the Middle East that addresses the digital domain is the EU's collaboration with the Gulf region. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In May 2022, the High Representative and the European Commission adopted a Joint Communication regarding a 'Strategic Partnership with the Gulf'. The statement, which also mentioned the influence of Russia's war on Ukraine, highlighted how this partnership is beneficial for both EU and Gulf Partners, framing the EU as a leading actor in global challenges such as climate change and digitalization. The EU’s Global Gateway initiative was stated as the framework for this cooperation with the Gulf.

When it comes to the EU-GCC partnership on digitalisation, the emphasis lies on digital transition, connectivity, and innovation. This cooperation under the Global Gateway includes deploying secure digital networks, promoting a human-centric approach to digitalisation, fostering cooperation on the data economy and artificial intelligence, and facilitating digital up-skilling, particularly for women and young people in the GCC countries. Additionally, it facilitates exchanges with Gulf nations concerning EU data protection policies and practices, aiming to foster closer alignment with both EU and global standards (European Commission & High Representative Of The Union For Foreign Affairs And Security Policy, 2022).

While the EU identifies itself primarily as a developmental donor in its strategic partnership with the Gulf (European Commission, 2022), portraying the GCC as a region with insufficient digital infrastructure and capabilities is misleading for European societies. The complexities of digitalisation geopolitics, including undersea cables and the AI supply chain, suggest broader implications that should inform future European digital policies.

EU-GCC crossroads: The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

The Gulf Region is situated at the crossroads of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) connecting China to Europe, at the center of the development of China's BRI through the Middle East. While China has faced several bans from powers like the United States such as the ban on Nvidia chips, it has introduced itself as a strong player in the race on AI leadership against the U.S. (Allison, 2019). China also plans to develop their AI technology goals up to 2030 sustaining the production of AI locally (State Council of the People's Republic of China et al., 2017). This strategically situates the GCC, the EU's partner, as closely connected to the emerging supply chain on BRI.

Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are among several GCC countries actively pursuing the development of local AI capabilities, with both nations becoming new members of BRICS following its expansion in 2024. The United Arab Emirates, for example, reported plans to join the AI supply chain as a semiconductor producer (Newman, 2024) in addition to launching its own large language model (LLM) called Falcon (Technology Innovation Institute, n.d.). Saudi Arabia has been confirmed to buy thousands of Nvidia’s graphics processing unit (GPU) chips (Al-Atrush et al., 2023). In addition, they announced the building of Shaheen III, the supercomputer (King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, 2023).

Thus, the depiction of the EU as a developmental patron to the Middle East, contextualized within the Third World narrative, contrasts with the new world order evolving around the Gulf Region. The Gulf Region's digital transformation and expanding digital economy may bring positive implications or contributions to Europe, particularly due to its proximity to the emerging AI supply chain at the intersection of the BRI and the development of local AI capabilities.

Undersea cables and global connectivity

Another digital infrastructure aspect that is part of the EU’s Global Gateway and relevant to EU-GCC partnership are the undersea cables. Recent temporary internet connectivity disruptions have been attributed to both natural events and human activities (Koka, 2022). This has led the EU and NATO to raise relevant maritime infrastructure security concerns (NATO, 2023). Notably, many of these disruptions have taken place in the Red Sea areas adjacent to the GCC countries (Monaghan et al., 2024), suggesting the region's importance in this regard.

In addition, the 2Africa cable system which connects Africa, Europe, and Asia was extended with new landing locations in all GCC countries (Oman, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia), in addition to Iraq, Pakistan, and India. This comprises the ‘2Africa Pearls’ branch (Salvadori, 2021), with extension as far as the Gulf of Oman (Emirates Telecommunications Group Company, 2024). These developments emphasise the depth and breadth of existing infrastructure in the Gulf, established through collaborations between multinational and local telecommunications and engineering firms.

In conclusion, it is imperative that European regulatory frameworks align with the infrastructural and technological shifts detailed in this article. This alignment can be achieved by incorporating external data flows and supply chains stemming from evolving diplomatic and digital alliances, whether with the Gulf region or others within the Global Gateway initiative, into future EU digital policies. In a similar vein, presenting the EU as a developmental supporter to the Middle East within the Third World narrative may mislead European society, as it overlooks the significant digital infrastructure, the emerging new world order surrounding the Gulf Region, and the potential contributions of GCC countries to Europe's digital economy. How to integrate the geopolitical, infrastructural, and technological shifts associated with the EU's 'Strategic Partnership with the Gulf', while maintaining European values and principles, remains a challenging matter of critical significance and urgency; particularly for European societies.