Internet community takes a hard end-of-2014 look at IANA

Monika Ermert, Heise, Intellectual Property Watch, VDI-Nachrichten, Germany

PUBLISHED ON: 23 Dec 2014

With the end of the year 2014 approaching, the internet community is feverishly putting together draft paper over draft paper on how the future Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) should be governed. Just before midnight, 22 December, the call of the Cross Community Working Group (CCWG) on all four different new oversight bodies closed – much to the dismay of some commentators who think more time is needed to decide on what could become one of the most fundamental changes in oversight over core infrastructure parts for the internet.

A mere nine months ago, the US National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) announced it would back off from its oversight role for IANA, the body that coordinates central databases for internet protocols, IP addresses and domain names. Now, the various bodies managing protocols (the Internet Engineering Task Force), numbers (so-called Regional Registries, RIRs) and names (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, ICANN) are pushing to finalise their respective proposals on who should oversee IANA in the future.

They all run to meet the 15 January deadline of the IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG), which has to knit proposals and additional public comments together. The ICG also needs to deliver a comprehensive proposal to the NTIA in time for the agency to decide on the terms of the IANA contract.

Oversight bodies and separation of functions

ICANN's Cross Community Working Groups (CCWG) have - as expected by many - come up with the most complicated draft proposal, which sets up not less than four new bodies to fill in for the NTIA:

1) the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT) is expected to step in with regard to contracting and recontracting, budget control and other key functions;

2) the Customer Standing Committee (CSC) filled with representatives from TLD registries (e.g.: .de, .cn, .com, .paris) should, according to the draft proposal check on agreed service levels for the IANA operation;

3) the Independent Appeals Panel (IAP) would be the appeal body where disputes arise over Root Zone or Root Zone WHOIS database entries. The Root Zone lies at the heart of the Domain Name System and establishes what name zones do exist on the net; and finally,

4) the special “Contract Co.”, which should act as the contracting party – one of the parts played by the NTIA so far - to the future IANA functions operator.

Other core NTIA roles, such as checking on additions or changes to the root zone and root zone WHOIS, is to be performed by an outside “Counsel“.

None of the other IANA customers, be it the IETF of the RIRs, have proposed substantial changes to the existing structure. In fact, the IETF in its draft states that “no new organizations or structures are required”. The IETF reasoning for the protocol function arrangements are that the system of agreements, policies, and oversight mechanisms established together since ICANN's creation are sufficient and “has worked well without any operational involvement from the NTIA”.

Similarly, the RIRs think a new contract between the IANA functions operator and the RIRs and a review team by the RIRs, organised in the Numbers Resource Organization will suffice, and notes “by building on the existing internet registry system (which is open to participation from all interested parties) and its structures, the proposal reduces the risk associated with creating new organizations whose accountability is unproven”.

Complex and heavyweight proposal, critics say

From the outset it was expected that the names part of IANA – the management of the authoritative root zone file – would be the most sensitive. The CWG proposal, which includes four or even five new institutional arrangements nevertheless drew sharp criticism. Too complex, too heavyweight in its attempt to solve accountability issues – was the reaction by many commentators who sent in their comments just before the 22 December deadline.

The Council of European National TLD Registries (CENTR) warned, “it is unfortunate

to see that the initial starting point that any replacement of the NTIA functions should be limited to a technical performance review seems to have been abandoned”. The biggest concern is that “references to the evaluation of delegation and redelegation reports can be interpreted as assigning additional authority to new committees and bodies”.

The fear of the country code TLDs clearly is “mission creep“ 1. Google spoke out against a shell Contract Co. Although this body is considered as a way to separate the IANA function from ICANN, the internet giant recommends to solve accountability issues by a measure such as the public posting of change requests to the root.

But while many comments are coming in against a Contract Co, there are also those who support it. Brazil, the only government that sent in comments before the deadline, welcomes the multi-institutional structure in principle, but asks for further clarification for the different bodies: With respect to the "Contract Co." organisation, Brazil addresses a specific issue that has resulted from discussions over the years: the jurisdictional link of the root zone management to the US. “Any institution replacing NTIA's role as IANA function contract administrator should not be subject to the jurisdiction of a single country, unless all stakeholders should so decide,” the Brazilian government writes.

Of timelines and budgets

The CWG proposal and the reactions to it are quite some food for thought, a rather heavy end of year meal - and there is not enough time to digest, many commentators complain. How much the timeline can be stretched in order to allow the NTIA to come up with a decision before 30 September 2015 has now to be considered by the IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group.

Republicans in the US Congress moreover made crystal clear that they are not favouring the transition to be successful, by linking a larger budgetary package to the budgetary stop on the NTIA's transition.

Footnotes

1. ”Mission creep is the expansion of a project or mission beyond its original goals,” cf. Wikipedia.

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